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Abstract—Decision trees are a powerful prediction model
with many applications in statistics, data mining, and machine
learning. In some settings, the model and the data to be classified
may contain sensitive information belonging to different parties.
In this paper, we, therefore, address the problem of privately
evaluating a decision tree on private data. This scenario consists
of a server holding a private decision tree model and a client
interested in classifying its private attribute vector using the
servers private model. The goal of the computation is to obtain
the classification while preserving the privacy of both the decision
tree and the client input. After the computation, the classification
result is revealed only to the client, and nothing else is revealed
neither to the client nor to the server. Existing privacy-preserving
protocols that address this problem use or combine different
generic secure multiparty computation approaches resulting in
several interactions between the client and the server. Our
goal is to design and implement a novel client-server protocol
that delegates the complete tree evaluation to the server while
preserving privacy and reducing the overhead. The idea is to use
fully (somewhat) homomorphic encryption and evaluate the tree
on ciphertexts encrypted under the client’s public key. However,
since current somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes have
high overhead, we combine efficient data representations with
different algorithmic optimizations to keep the computational
overhead and the communication cost low. As a result, we are able
to provide the first non-interactive protocol, that allows the client
to delegate the evaluation to the server by sending an encrypted
input and receiving only the encryption of the result. Our scheme
has only one round and can evaluate a complete tree of depth 10
within seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
A machine learning process consists of two phases. In the
first phase or learning phase, a model or classifier is built on
a possibly large set of training data. The model can then be
used to classify new data.
a) Setting: Machine learning (ML) classifiers are valu-
able tools in many areas such as healthcare, finance, spam
filtering, intrusion detection, remote diagnosis, etc [52]. To
perform their task, these classifiers often require access to
personal sensitive data such as medical or financial records.
Therefore, it is crucial to investigate technologies that preserve
the privacy of the data, while benefiting from the advantages
of ML. On the one hand, the ML model itself may contain
sensitive data. For example, a bank that uses a decision tree
for credit assessment of its customers may not want to reveal
any information about the model. On the other hand, the model
may have been built on sensitive data. It is known that white-
box and sometimes even black-box access to a ML model
allows so-called model inversion attacks [29], [49], [54], which
can compromise the privacy of the training data. As a result,
making the ML model public could violate the privacy of the
training data.
b) Scenario: In this paper, we therefore address the
problem of private decision tree evaluation (PDTE) on private
data. This scenario consists of a server holding a private
decision tree model and a client wanting to classify its private
attribute vector using the servers private model. The goal of
the computation is to obtain the classification while preserving
the privacy of both the decision tree and the client input. After
the computation, the classification result is revealed only to the
client, and beyond that, nothing further is revealed to neither
party. The problem can be solved using any generic secure
multiparty computation. There exist specialized solutions that
combine different techniques and use the domain knowledge
to develop efficient protocols.
c) Generic Secure Two-party Computation Solution:
Generic secure two-party computation [21], [31], [55], such
as garbled circuit and secret sharing, can implement PDTE.
The idea is to transform the decision tree program into a
secure representation that can be evaluated without revealing
private data. There exist frameworks such as ObliVM [40] or
CBMC-GC [28] that are able to automate the transformation
of the plaintext programs, written in a high level program-
ming language, into oblivious programs suitable for secure
computation. Their straightforward application to decision tree
programs does certainly improve performance over a hand-
crafted construction. However, the size of the resulting obliv-
ious program is still proportional to the size of the tree. As a
result generic solution are in general inefficient, in particular
when the size of the tree is large.
d) Specialized Solutions: Specialized protocols [3], [7],
[10], [35], [37], [48], [50], [53] exploit the domain knowledge
of the problem at hand and make use of generic techniques
only where it is necessary, resulting in more efficient solutions.
Existing protocols for PDTE have several rounds requiring sev-
eral interactions between the client and the server. Moreover,
the communication cost depends on the size of the decision
tree, while only a single classification is required by the client.
Finally, they also require computational power from the client
that depends on the size of the tree.
e) Our Solution Approach: Our goal is to design and
implement a novel client-server protocol that delegates the
complete tree evaluation to the server while preserving privacy
and keeping the performance acceptable. The idea is to use
fully or somewhat homomorphic encryption (FHE/SHE) and
evaluate the tree on ciphertexts encrypted under the client’s
public key. As a result, no intermediate or final computational
result is revealed to the evaluating server. However, since
current somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes have high
overhead, we combine efficient data representations with dif-
ferent algorithmic optimizations to keep the computational
overhead and the communication cost low. At the end, the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
08
36
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 S
ep
 20
19
computational overhead might still be higher than in existing
protocols, however the computation task can be parallelized
resulting in a reduced computation time. As a result, we
are able to provide the first non-interactive protocol, that
allows the client to delegate the evaluation to the server by
sending an encrypted input and receiving only the encryption
of the result. Finally, existing approaches are secure in the
semi-honest model and can be made one-sided simulatable1
using techniques that may double the computation and com-
munication costs. Our approach is one-sided simulatable by
default, as the client does no more than encrypting its input
and decrypting the final result of the computation (simulating
the client is straightforward), while the server evaluates on
ciphertexts encrypted with a semantically secure encryption
under the client’s public key.
f) Applications (ML-as-a-service): Concrete motiva-
tion of our approach are machine learning settings (with
applications in areas such as healthcare, finance etc.) where
the server is computationally powerful, the client is computa-
tionally weak and the network connection is not very fast.
Many cloud providers are already proposing platforms that
allow users to build machine learning applications [2], [6],
[32], [43], [45]. A hospital may want to use such a platform to
offer a medical expert system as a ML-as-a-service application
to other doctors or even its patients. A software provider may
leverage ML-as-a-service to allow its customers to detect the
cause of a software error. Software systems use log files to
collect information about the system behavior. In case of an
error these log files can be used to find the cause of the crash.
Both examples (medical data and log files) contain sensitive
information which is worth protecting.
g) Contribution: Our contributions are as follows:● We propose a non-interactive protocol for PDTE. Our
scheme allows the client to delegate the evaluation to
the server by sending an encrypted input and receiving
only the encryption of the result.● We propose PDT-BIN which is an instantiation of
the main protocol with binary representation of the
input. Then we combine efficient data representations
with different algorithmic optimizations to keep the
computational overhead and the communication cost
low.● We propose PDT-INT which is an instantiation of
the main protocol using arithmetic circuit, where the
values are compared using a modified variant of
LinTzeng comparison protocol [39].● We provide correctness and security proofs of our
scheme. Finally, we implement and benchmark both
instantiations using HElib [33] and TFHE [19].
h) Structure: The remainder of the paper is struc-
tured as follows. We review related work in Section II and
preliminaries in Section III before defining correctness and
security of our protocol in Section IV. The basic construction
itself is described in Section V. In Section VI, we describe
1A 2-party protocol between parties P1 and P2 in which only P2 receives
an output, is one-sided simulatable if it is private (via indistinguishability)
against a corrupt P1 and fully simulatable against a corrupt P2 [34].
implementation and optimization using a binary representation.
In Section VII, we describe an implementation using an
arithmetic circuit based on LinTzeng comparison protocol [39].
We discuss implementation and evaluation details in Section
VIII before concluding our work in Section IX. Due to space
constraints, we discuss further details in the appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to secure multiparty computation
(SMC) [5], [11], [21], [25], [26], [31], [36], [55], private func-
tion evaluation (PFE) [38], [44] particularly privacy-preserving
decision tree evaluation [3], [7], [10], [35], [37], [48], [50],
[53] which we briefly review in this section and refer to the
literature for more details.
Brikell et al. [10] propose the first protocol for PDTE by
combining homomorphic encryption (HE) and garbled circuits
(GC) in a novel way. The server transforms the decision tree
into a GC that is executed by the client. To allow the client to
learn its garbling key, they combine homomorphic encryption
and oblivious transfer (OT). Although the evaluation time
of Brikell et al.’s scheme is sublinear in the tree size, the
secure program itself and hence the communication cost is
linear and therefore not efficient for large trees. Barni et
al. [3] improve the previous scheme by not including the leaf
node in the transformed secure program, thereby reducing
the computation costs by a constant factor. Bost et al. [7]
represent the decision tree as a multivariate polynomial. The
constants in the polynomial are the classification labels and
the variables represent the results of the Boolean conditions at
the decision nodes. The parties privately compute the values
of the Boolean conditions by comparing each threshold with
the corresponding attribute value encrypted under the client’s
public key. Finally, the server homomorphically evaluates the
polynomial and returns the result to the client. Wu et al. [53]
use different techniques that require only additively HE (AHE).
They also use the protocol from [24] for comparison and reveal
to the server comparison bits encrypted under the client’s
public key. The evaluation of the tree by the sever returns the
index of the corresponding classification label to the client.
Finally, an OT reveals the final result to the client. Tai et
al. [48] use the comparison protocol of [24] and AHE as well.
They mark the left and right edge of each node with the cost b
and 1− b respectively, where b is the result of the comparison
at that node. Finally, they sum for each path of the tree the cost
along it. The label of the path whose costs sum to zero, is the
classification label. Tueno et al. [50] represent the tree as an
array. Then they execute d depth of the tree comparisons, each
performed using a small garbled circuit, which outputs secret-
shares of the index of the next node in tree. They introduce a
primitive called oblivious array indexing, that allow the parties
to select the next node without learning it. Kiss et al. [37]
propose a modular design consisting of the sub-functionalities:
selection of attributes, integer comparison, and evaluation of
paths. They then explore the tradeoffs and performance of
possible combinations of state-of-the-art protocols for privately
computing the sub-functionalities. De Cock et al. [20] follow
the same idea as some previous schemes by first running
comparisons. In contrast to all other protocols (ours included),
which are secure in the computational setting, they operate
in the information theoretic model using secret sharing based
SMC and commodity-based cryptography [4] to reduce the
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Symbol Interpretation
µ Bit length of attribute values
n Dimension of the attribute vector
x = x0, . . . , xn−1 Attribute vector∣α∣ Bitlength of integer α, e.g., ∣xi∣ = µ
xbi = xiµ . . . xi1 Bit representation of xi with most significant bit xiµ
M Number of nodes
m Number of decision nodes
d Depth of the decision tree⟦α⟧ Ciphertext HE of a plaintext α⟦xbi⟧ Bitwise encryption (⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧) of xi⟦α1∣ . . . ∣αs⟧ Packed ciphertext containing plaintexts α1, . . . , αs
s Number of slots in a packed ciphertext⟦x⃗i⟧ Packed ciphertext ⟦xiµ∣ . . . ∣xi1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧ of xbi
TABLE I: Notations.
Scheme Rounds Tools Commu- Compa- Leakage
nication risons
[10] ≈5 HE+GC O(2d) d m,d
[3] ≈4 HE+GC O(2d) d m,d
[7] ≥6 FHE/SHE O(2d) m m
[53] 6 HE+OT O(2d) m m
[48] 4 HE O(2d) m m
[20] ≈9 SS O(2d) m m,d
[50] O(d) GC,OT O(2d) d m,d
ORAM O(d2)
[41] 1 FHE/SHE O(2d) m m
PDT-BIN 1 FHE/SHE O(1) or O(d) m -
PDT-INT 1 O(2d/s) m
TABLE II: Comparison of PDTE protocols.
number of interactions. Using a polynomial encoding of the
inputs, Lu et al. [41] propose a non-interactive comparison
protocol called XCMP using BGV homomorphic scheme [8].
They then implement the private decision tree protocol of
Tai et al. [48] using XCMP which is output expressive (i.e.,
it preserves additive homomorphism). The resulting decision
tree protocol is non-interactive and efficient because of the
small multiplicative depth. However, it is not generic, that is,
it primarily works for small inputs and depends explicitly on
BGV-type HE scheme. Moreover, it does not support SIMD
operations and is no longer output expressive as XCMP. Hence,
it cannot be extended to a larger protocol (e.g., random forest
[9]) while preserving the non-interactive property. Finally, its
output length (i.e., the number of resulted ciphertexts from
server computation) is exponential in the depth of the tree,
while the output length of our binary instantiation is at most
linear in the depth of the tree and the integer instantiation can
use SIMD to considerably reduce it. A comparison of decision
protocols is summarized in Table II and III. A more detailed
complexity analysis is described in Appendix B.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the background concepts for the
remainder of the paper. The core concept is fully/somewhat
homomorphic encryption. For ease of exposition and under-
standing, we abstract away the mathematical technicalities
behind homomorphic encryption and refer the reader to the
relevant literature [1], [8], [15], [16], [18], [19], [22], [23],
[30], [46], [47].
a) Homomorphic Encryption: A homomorphic encryp-
tion (HE) allows computations on ciphertexts by generating
an encrypted result whose decryption matches the result of
Scheme SIMD Generic Output- Multiplicative Output
expressive Depth Length
[41] no no no 3 2d+1
PDT-BIN yes yes yes ∣µ∣ + ∣d∣ + 2 1 or d
PDT-INT yes yes no ∣µ∣ + 1 ⌈2d/s⌉
TABLE III: Comparison of 1-round PDTE protocols.
a function on the plaintexts. In this paper, we focus on
homomorphic encryption schemes (particularly lattice-based)
that allow many chained additions and multiplications to be
computed on plaintext homomorphically. In these schemes, the
plaintext space is usually a ring Zq[X]/(XN + 1), where q is
prime and N might be a power of 2. A HE scheme consists
of the following algorithms:● pk, sk, ek ← KGen(λ): This probabilistic algorithm
takes a security parameter λ and outputs public, pri-
vate and evaluation key pk, sk and ek.● c← Enc(pk,m): This probabilistic algorithm takes pk
and a message m and outputs a ciphertext c. We will
use ⟦m⟧ as a shorthand notation for Enc(pk,m).● c ← Eval(ek, f, c1, . . . , cn): This probabilistic algo-
rithm takes ek, an n-ary function f and n ciphertexts
c1, . . . cn and outputs a ciphertext c.● m′ ← Dec(sk, c): This deterministic algorithm takes
sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m′.
We require IND-CPA and the following correctness conditions∀m1, . . . ,mn and m⃗ = m1, . . . ,mn:● Dec(sk,Enc(pk,mi)) = Dec(sk, ⟦mi⟧) = mi,● Dec(sk,Eval(ek, f, ⟦m1⟧, . . . , ⟦mn⟧)) =
Dec(sk, ⟦f(m⃗)⟧).
The encryption algorithm Enc adds “noise” to the cipher-
text which increases during homomorphic evaluation. While
addition of ciphertexts increases the noise linearly, the multi-
plication increases it exponentially [8]. If the noise become too
large then correct decryption is no longer possible. To prevent
this from happening, one can either keep the circuit’s depth of
the function f low enough or use the refresh algorithm. This
algorithm consists either of a bootstrapping procedure, which
takes a ciphertext with large noise and outputs a ciphertext
of the same message with a fixed amount of noise; or a key-
switching procedure, which takes a ciphertext under one key
and outputs a ciphertext of the same message under a different
key [1]. In this paper, we will consider both bootstrapping and
the possibility of keeping the circuit’s depth low by designing
our PDTE using so-called leveled fully homomorphic encryp-
tion. A leveled fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has an
extra parameter L such that the scheme can evaluate all circuits
of depth at most L without bootstrapping.
b) Homomorphic Operations: We assume a BGV type
homomorphic encryption scheme [8]. Plaintexts can be en-
crypted using an integer representation (an integer xi is en-
crypted as ⟦xi⟧) or a binary representation (each bit of the
bit representation xbi = xiµ . . . xi1 is encrypted). We describe
below homomorphic operations in the binary representation
(i.e., arithmetic operations mod 2). They work similarly in
the integer representation.
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The FHE scheme might support Smart and Vercauteren’s
ciphertext packing (SVCP) technique [47] to pack many plain-
texts in one ciphertext. Using SVCP, a ciphertext consists
of a fixed number s of slots, each capable of holding one
plaintext, i.e. ⟦⋅∣ ⋅ ∣ . . . ∣⋅⟧. The encryption of a bit b replicates
b to all slots, i.e., ⟦b⟧ = ⟦b∣b∣ . . . ∣b⟧. However, we can also
pack the bits of xbi in one ciphertext and will denote it by⟦x⃗i⟧ = ⟦xiµ∣ . . . ∣xi1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧.
The computation relies on some built-in routines, that
allow homomorphic operations on encrypted data. The relevant
routines for our scheme are: addition (SHEADD), multiplica-
tion (SHEMULT) and comparison (SHECMP). These routines
are compatible with the ciphertext packing technique (i.e.,
operations are replicated on all slots in a SIMD manner).
The routine SHEADD takes two or more ciphertexts and
performs a component-wise addition modulo two, i.e., we
have:
SHEADD(⟦bi1∣ . . . ∣bis⟧, ⟦bj1∣ . . . ∣bjs⟧) = ⟦bi1⊕bj1∣ . . . ∣bis⊕bjs⟧.
Similarly, SHEMULT performs component-wise multiplication
modulo two, i.e., we have:
SHEMULT(⟦bi1∣ . . . ∣bis⟧, ⟦bj1∣ . . . ∣bjs⟧) = ⟦bi1⋅bj1∣ . . . ∣bis⋅bjs⟧.
We will also denote addition and multiplication by ⊕ and ⊙,
respectively.
Let xi, xj be two integers, bij = [xi > xj] and bji = [xj >
xi], the routine SHECMP takes ⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧, compares xi and
xj and returns ⟦bij⟧, ⟦bji⟧:(⟦bij⟧, ⟦bji⟧)← SHECMP(⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧).
Note that, if the inputs to SHECMP encrypt the same value,
then the routine outputs two ciphertexts of 0. This routine
implements the comparison circuit described in [12]–[14].
If ciphertext packing is enabled, then we also assume
the HE supports shift operations. Given a packed ciphertext⟦b1∣ . . . ∣bs⟧, the shift left operation shifts all slots to the left
by a given offset, using zero-fill, i.e., shifting ⟦b1∣ . . . ∣bs⟧ by i
positions returns ⟦bi∣ . . . ∣bs∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧. The shift right operation
is defined similarly for shifting to the right.
IV. DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce relevant definitions and nota-
tions for our scheme. Our definitions and notations are similar
to previous work [20], [48], [50], [53]. With [a, b], we denote
the set of all integers from a to b. Let c0, . . . , ck−1 be the
classification labels, k ∈ N>0.
Definition 4.1 (Decision Tree): A decision tree (DT) is a
function T ∶ Zn → {c0, . . . , ck−1} that maps an attribute vector
x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) to a finite set of classification labels. The
tree consists of:● internal or decision nodes containing a test condition● leave nodes containing a classification label.
A decision tree model consists of a decision tree and the
following functions:
● a function thr that assigns to each decision node a
threshold value, thr ∶ [0,m − 1]→ Z,● a function att that assigns to each decision node an
attribute index, att ∶ [0,m − 1]→ [0, n − 1], and● a labeling function lab that assigns to each leaf node
a label, lab ∶ [m,M − 1]→ {c0, . . . , ck−1}.
The decision at each decision node is a “greater-than” compar-
ison between the assigned threshold and attribute values, i.e.,
the decision at node v is [xatt(v) ≥ thr(v)].
Definition 4.2 (Node Indices): Given a decision tree, the
index of a node is its order as computed by breadth-first search
(BFS) traversal, starting at the root with index 0. If the tree is
complete, then a node with index v has left child 2v + 1 and
right child 2v + 2.
We will also refer to the node with index v as the node
v. W.l.o.g, we will use [0, k − 1] as classification labels (i.e.,
cj = j for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) and we will label the first (second,
third, . . .) leaf in BFS traversal with classification label 0
(1, 2, . . .). For a complete decision tree with depth d, the
leaves have indices ranging from 2d,2d + 1, . . .2d+1 − 2 and
classification labels ranging from 0, . . . ,2d − 1 respectively.
Since the classification labeling is now independent of the tree,
we use M = (T , thr, att) to denote a decision tree model
consisting of a tree T and the labeling functions thr, att
as defined above. We also assume that the tree parameters
d,m,M can be derived from T .
Definition 4.3 (Decision Tree Evaluation): Given
x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and M = (T , thr, att), then starting
at the root, the Decision Tree Evaluation (DTE) evaluates at
each reached node v the decision b ← [xatt(v) ≥ thr(v)] and
moves either to the left (if b = 0) or right (if b = 1) subsequent
node. The evaluation returns the label of the reached leaf as
result of the computation. We denote this by T (x).
Definition 4.4 (Private DTE): Given a client with a pri-
vate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and a server with a private M =(T , thr, att), a private DTE (PDTE) functionality evaluates
the model M on input x, then reveals to the client the
classification label T (x) and nothing else, while the server
learns nothing, i.e.,FPDTE(M, x)→ (ε,T (x)).
Definition 4.5 (Correctness): Given a client with a pri-
vate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and a server with a private M =(T , thr, att), a protocol Π correctly implements a PDTE
functionality if after the computation it holds for the result
c obtained by the client that c = T (x).
Besides correctness, parties must learn only what they are
allowed to. To formalize this, we need the following two
definitions. A function µ ∶ N → R is negligible, if for every
positive polynomial p(.) there exists an  such that for all
n > : µ(n) < 1/p(n). Two distributions D1 and D2 are
computationally indistinguishable (denoted D1 c≡ D1) if no
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm can distinguish
them except with negligible probability.
In SMC protocols, the view of a party consists of its input
and the sequence of messages that it has received during the
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protocol execution [31]. The protocol is said to be secure, if for
each party, one can construct a simulator that, given only the
input of that party and the output, can generate a distribution
that is computationally indistinguishable to the party’s view.
Definition 4.6 (PDTE Security): Given a client with a pri-
vate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and a server with a private M =(T , thr, att), a protocol ΠPDTE securely implements the PDTE
functionality in the semi-honest model if the following holds:● there exists a PPT algorithm SimpdteS that simulates
the server’s view ViewΠPDTES given only the private
decision tree model (T , thr, att) such that:
SimpdteS (M, ε) c≡ ViewΠPDTES (M, x), (1)● there exists a PPT algorithm SimpdteC that simulates
the client’s view ViewΠPDTEC given only the depth d of
the tree, x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and a classification labelT (x) ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that:
SimpdteC (⟨d, x⟩ ,T (x)) c≡ ViewΠPDTEC (M, x). (2)
A protocol ΠPDTE securely implements the PDTE functionality
with one-sided simulation if the following conditions hold:● for every pair x,x′ of different client’s inputs, it holds:
ViewΠPDTES (M, x) c≡ ViewΠPDTES (M, x′), (3)● ΠPDTE is simulatable against every PPT adversary
controlling C.
Note that for the one-sided simulation, the requirement in
Equation 3 is that the protocol should be indistinguishable
against any PPT adversary that controls the server. This means,
the server should not be able to distinguish between the
case where the client uses x and the case where it uses
x′. Moreover, the protocol should be simulatable against any
adversary controlling the client [34].
V. THE BASIC PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a modular description of our
basic protocol. We start by describing the data structure.
A. Data Structure
We follow the idea of some previous protocols [7], [20],
[48] of marking edges of the tree with comparison result. So
if the comparison at node v is the bit b then we mark the right
edge outgoing from v with b and the left edge with 1− b. For
convenience, we will instead store this information at the child
nodes of v and refer to it as cmp.
Definition 5.1 (Data Structure): For a decision tree modelM = (T , thr, att), we let Node be a data structure that for
each node v defines the following fields:● v.threshold stores the threshold thr(v) of the node v● v.aIndex stores the associated index att(v)● v.parent stores the pointer to the parent node which
is null for the root node● v.left stores the pointer to the left child node which
is null for each leaf node
● v.right stores the pointer to the right child node which
is null for each leaf node● v.cmp is computed during the tree evaluation and
stores the comparison bit
b← [xatt(v.parent) ≥ thr(v.parent)]
if v is a right node. Otherwise it stores 1 − b.● v.cLabel stores the classification label if v is a leaf
node and the empty string otherwise.
We use D to denote the set of all decision nodes and L the
set of all leave nodes of M. As a result, we use the equivalent
notation M = (T , thr, att) = (D,L).
With the data structure defined above, we now define the
classification function as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Classification Function): Let the attribute
vector be x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and the decision tree model beM = (D,L). We define the classification function to be
fc(x,M) = tr(x, root),
where root is the root node and tr is the traverse function
define as:
tr(x, v) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
tr(x, v.left) if v ∈ D and xv.aIndex < v.threshold
tr(x, v.right) if v ∈ D and xv.aIndex ≥ v.threshold
v if v ∈ L
Lemma 5.3: Let x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) be an attribute vector
and M = (T , thr, att) = (D,L) a decision model. We have
T (x) = b ⋅ tr(x, root.right) + (1 − b) ⋅ tr(x, root.left),
where b = [xatt(root) ≥ thr(root)] is the comparison at the root
node.
Proof: The proof follows by induction on the depth of the
tree. In the base case, we have a tree of depth one (i.e., the
root and two leaves). In the induction step, we have two trees
of depth d and we joint them by adding a new root.
B. Algorithms
a) Initialization: The Initialization consists of a one-
time key generation. The client generates appropriate triple(pk, sk, ek) of public, private and evaluation keys for a homo-
morphic encryption scheme. Then the client sends (pk, ek)
to the server. For each input classification, the client just
encrypts its input and sends it to the server. To reduce the
communication cost of sending client’s input, one can use a
trusted randomizer that does not take part in the real protocol
and is not allowed to collaborate with the server. The trusted
randomizer generates a list of random strings r and sends the
encrypted strings ⟦r⟧ to server and the list of r’s to the client.
For an input x, the client then sends x + r to the server in
the real protocol. This technique is similar to the commodity
based cryptography [4] with the difference that the client can
play the role of the randomizer itself and sends the list of ⟦r⟧’s
(when the network is not too busy) before the protocol’s start.
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1: function EVALDNODE(D, ⟦x⟧)
2: for each v ∈ D do
3: ⟦b⟧← ⟦[xv.aIndex ≥ v.threshold]⟧
4: ⟦v.right.cmp⟧← ⟦b⟧
5: ⟦v.left.cmp⟧← ⟦1 − b⟧
Algorithm 1: Computing a Decision Bit
1: function EVALPATHS(D,L)
2: let Q be a queue
3: Q.enqueue(root)
4: while Q.empty() = false do
5: v ← Q.dequeue()
6: ⟦v.left.cmp⟧← ⟦v.left.cmp⟧⊙ ⟦v.cmp⟧,
7: ⟦v.right.cmp⟧← ⟦v.right.cmp⟧⊙ ⟦v.cmp⟧
8: if v.left ∈ D then
9: Q.enqueue(v.left)
10: if v.right ∈ D then
11: Q.enqueue(v.right)
Algorithm 2: Aggregating Decision Bits
b) Computing Decision Bits: The server starts by com-
puting for each node v ∈ D the comparison bit b ← [xatt(v) ≥
thr(v)] and stores b at the right child node (v.right.cmp = b)
and 1 − b at the left child node (v.left.cmp = 1 − b). It is
illustrated in Algorithm 1.
c) Aggregating Decision Bits: Then for each leaf node
v, the server aggregates the comparison bits along the path
from the root to v. We implement it using a queue and
traversing the tree in BFS as illustrated in Algorithm 2.
d) Finalizing: After Aggregating the decision bits along
the path to the leave nodes, each leaf node v stores either
v.cmp = 0 or v.cmp = 1. Then, the server aggregates the
decision bits at the leaves by computing for each leaf v the
value ⟦v.cmp⟧⊙ ⟦v.cLabel⟧ and summing all the results. This
is illustrated in Algorithm 3.
e) Putting It All Together: As illustrated in Algorithm
4, the whole computation is performed by the server. It
sequentially computes the algorithms described above and
sends the resulting ciphertext to the client. The client decrypts
and outputs the resulting classification label. The correctness is
straightforward and follows from Lemma 5.3. The algorithms
are straightforward and easy to understand. However, their
naive application is inefficient.
1: function FINALIZE(L)
2: ⟦result⟧← ⟦0⟧
3: for each v ∈ L do
4: ⟦result⟧← ⟦result⟧⊕ (⟦v.cmp⟧⊙ ⟦v.cLabel⟧)
5: return ⟦result⟧
Algorithm 3: Finalizing
Client Server
Input: x Input: M = (D,L)
Output: T (x) Output: ε
⟦x⟧
EVALDNODE(D, ⟦x⟧)
EVALPATHS(D,L)⟦T (x)⟧← FINALIZE(L)⟦T (x)⟧
Protocol 4: The Basic Protocol
VI. BINARY IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe PDT-BIN, an instantiation of
the basic scheme that requires encoding the plaintexts using
their bit representation. Hence, ciphertexts encrypt bits and
arithmetic operations are done mod 2.
A. Input Encoding
In this implementation, we encrypt plaintext bitwise. For
each plaintext xi with bit representation xbi = xiµ . . . xi1, we
use ⟦xbi ⟧ to denote the vector (⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧), consisting of
encryptions of the bits of xi. As a result, the client needs to
send nµ ciphertexts for the n attribute values. Unfortunately,
homomorphic ciphertexts might be quite large. We can already
use the trusted randomizer as explained before to send blinded
inputs instead of ciphertexts in this phase. This, however,
improves only the online communication. We additionally
want to use the SVCP SIMD technique that allows to pack
many plaintexts into the same ciphertext and manipulate them
together during homomorphic operations.
B. Ciphertext Packing
In the binary encoding, ciphertext packing means that each
ciphertext encrypts s bits, where s is the number of slots in
the ciphertext. Then we can use this property in three different
ways. First, one could pack the bit representation of each
classification label in a single ciphertext and allow the server to
send back a single ciphertext to the client. Second, one could
encrypt several attributes together and classify them with a
single protocol evaluation. Finally, one could encrypt multiple
decision node thresholds that must be compared to the same
attribute in the decision tree model.
a) Packing Classification Label’s Bits: Aggregating the
decision bits using Algorithm 2 produces for each leaf v ∈ L
a decision bit ⟦bv⟧ which encrypts 1 for the classification leaf
and 0 otherwise. Moreover, because of SVCP, the bit bv is
replicated to all slots. Now, let k be the number of classification
labels (i.e., ∣L∣ = k) and its bitlength be ∣k∣. For each v ∈ L,
we let cv denote the classification label v.cLabel which is ∣k∣-
bit long and has bit representation cbv = cv∣k∣ . . . cv1 with cor-
responding packed encryption ⟦c⃗v⟧ = ⟦cv∣k∣∣ . . . ∣cv1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧.
As a result, computing ⟦bv⟧ ⊙ ⟦c⃗v⟧ for each leaf v ∈ L and
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summing over all leaves results in the correct classification
label. Note that, this assumes that one is classifying only one
vector and not many as in the the next case.
b) Packing Attribute Values: Let x(1), . . . , x(s) be s
possible attribute vectors with x(l) = [x(l)1 , . . . , x(l)n ], 1 ≤ l ≤ s.
For each x(l)i , let x(l)bi = x(l)iµ , . . . , x(l)i1 be the bit representation.
Then, the client generates for each attribute xi the ciphertexts⟦cxiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦cxi2⟧, ⟦cxi1⟧ as illustrated in Equation 4.
⟦cxi1⟧ = ⟦x(1)i1 ∣x(2)i1 ∣ . . . ∣x(s)i1 ⟧⟦cxi2⟧ = ⟦x(1)i2 ∣x(2)i2 ∣ . . . ∣x(s)i2 ⟧
. . .⟦cxiµ⟧ = ⟦x(1)iµ ∣x(2)iµ ∣ . . . ∣x(s)iµ ⟧
Manual Packing of xi (4)
To shorten the notation, let yj denote the threshold of
the j-th decision node (i.e., yj = vj .threshold) and assume
vj .aIndex = i. The server just encrypts each threshold bitwise
which automatically replicates the bit to all slots. This is
illustrated in Equation 5.⟦cyj1⟧ = ⟦yj1∣yj1∣ . . . ∣yj1⟧⟦cyj2⟧ = ⟦yj2∣yj2∣ . . . ∣yj2⟧
. . .⟦cyjµ⟧ = ⟦yjµ∣yjµ∣ . . . ∣yjµ⟧
Automatic Packing of yj
(5)
Note that (⟦cyjµ⟧, . . . , ⟦cyj1⟧) = ⟦ybj ⟧ holds because of SVCP.
The above described encoding allows to compare s attribute
values together with one threshold. This is possible because
the routine SHECMP is compatible with SVCP such that we
have:
SHECMP((⟦cxiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦cxi1⟧), (⟦cyjµ⟧, . . . , ⟦cyj1⟧)) =(⟦b(1)ij ∣b(2)ij ∣ . . . ∣b(s)ij ⟧, ⟦b(1)ji ∣b(2)ji ∣ . . . ∣b(s)ji ⟧), (6)
where b(l)ij = [x(l)i > yj] and b(l)ji = [yj > x(l)i ]. This results in a
single ciphertext such that the l-th slot contains the comparison
result between x(l)i and yj .
Aggregating decision bits remains unchanged as described
in Algorithm 2. This results in a packed ciphertext ⟦bv⟧ =⟦b(1)v ∣ . . . ∣b(s)v ⟧ for each leaf v ∈ L, where b(l)v = 1 if x(l)
classifies to leaf v and b(l)u = 0 for all other leaf u ∈ L − {v}.
For the classification label cv of a leaf v ∈ L, let⟦cbv⟧ = (⟦cv∣k∣⟧, . . . , ⟦cv1⟧) denote the encryption of the bit
representation cbv = cv∣k∣ . . . cv1. To select the correct classifi-
cation label Algorithm 3 is updated as follows. We compute⟦cv∣k∣⟧⊙⟦bv⟧, . . . , ⟦cv1⟧⊙⟦bv⟧ for each leaf v ∈ L and sum them
component-wise over all leaves. This results in the encrypted
bit representation of the correct classification labels.
c) Packing Threshold Values: In this case, the client
encrypts a single attribute in one ciphertext, while the server
encrypts multiple threshold values in a single ciphertext.
Hence, for an attribute value xi, the client generates the
ciphertexts as in Equation 7. Let mi be the number of decision
nodes that compare to the attribute xi (i.e., mi = ∣{vj ∈ D ∶
vj .aIndex = i}∣). The server packs all corresponding threshold
values in ⌈mi
s
⌉ ciphertext(s) as illustrated in Equation 8.
⟦cxi1⟧ = ⟦xi1∣xi1∣ . . . ∣xi1⟧⟦cxi2⟧ = ⟦xi2∣xi2∣ . . . ∣xi2⟧
. . .⟦cxiµ⟧ = ⟦xiµ∣xiµ∣ . . . ∣xiµ⟧
Automatic Packing of xi
(7)
⟦cyj1⟧ = ⟦yj11∣ . . . ∣yjmi1∣ . . .⟧⟦cyj2⟧ = ⟦yj12∣ . . . ∣yjmi2∣ . . .⟧
. . .⟦cyjµ⟧ = ⟦yj1µ∣ . . . ∣yjmiµ∣ . . .⟧
Manual Packing of yj
(8)
The packing of threshold values allows to compare one at-
tribute value against multiple threshold values together. Unfor-
tunately, we do not have access to the slots while performing
homomorphic operation. Hence, to aggregate the decision bits,
we make mi copies of the resulting packed decision bits and
shift left each decision bit to the first slot. Then the aggregation
of the decision bits and the finalizing algorithm work as in the
previous case with the only difference that only the result in
the first slot matters and the remaining can be set to 0.
C. Efficient Path Evaluation
As explained above, the encryption algorithm Enc adds
noise to the ciphertext which increases during homomorphic
evaluation. While addition of ciphertexts increases the noise
slightly, the multiplication increases it explosively [8]. The
noise must be kept low enough to prevent incorrect decryption.
To keep the noise low, one can either keep the circuits depth
low enough or use the refresh algorithm. In this section, we
will focusing on keeping the circuit depth low.
Definition 6.1 (Multiplicative Depth): Let f be a function
and Cf be a boolean circuit that computes f and consists of
AND-gates or multiplication (modulo 2) gates and XOR-
gates or addition (modulo 2) gates . The circuit depth of Cf
is the maximal length of a path from an input gate to an
output gate. The multiplicative depth of Cf is the path from
an input gate to an output gate with the largest number of of
multiplication gates.
For example, consider the function f([a1, . . . , an]) =
Πni=1ai. A circuit that successively multiplies the ai has
multiplicative depth n. However, a circuit that divides the array
in two halves, multiplies the elements in each half and finally
multiplies the result, has multiplicative depth ⌈n
2
⌉ + 1. This
gives the intuition for the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2 (Logarithmic Multiplicative Depth Circuit):
Let [a1, . . . , an] be an array of n integers and f be the
function defined as follows: f([a1, . . . , an]) = [a′1, . . . a′⌈n
2
⌉]
where
a′i = {a2i−1 ⋅ a2i if (n mod 2 = 0) ∨ (i < ⌈n2 ⌉),an if (n mod 2 = 1) ∧ (i = ⌈n2 ⌉).
Moreover, let f be the iterated function where f i is the i-th
iterate of f defined as follows:
f i([a1, . . . , an]) = {[a1, . . . , an] if i = 0,
f(f i−1([a1, . . . , an])) if i ≥ 1.
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Input: leaves set L, decision nodes set D
Output: Updated v.cmp for each v ∈ L
1: function EVALPATHSE(L, D)
2: for each v ∈ L do
3: let d = number of nodes on the path (root→ v)
4: let path be an empty array of length d
5: l ← d
6: w ← v
7: while w ≠ root do ▷ construct path to root
8: path[l]← ⟦w.cmp⟧
9: l ← l − 1
10: w ← w.parent
11: ⟦v.cmp⟧← EVALMUL(1, d,path)
Input: integers from and to, array of nodes path
Output: Product of elements in path
1: function EVALMUL(from, to,path)
2: if from ≥ to then
3: return path[from]
4: n← to − from + 1
5: mid← 2∣n−1∣−1 + from − 1 ▷ ∣n∣ bitlength of n
6: ⟦left⟧← EVALMUL(from,mid,path)
7: ⟦right⟧← EVALMUL(mid + 1, to,path)
8: return ⟦left⟧⊙ ⟦right⟧
Algorithm 5: Paths Evaluation with log Multiplicative Depth
The ∣n∣-th iterate f ∣n∣ of f computes Πni=1ai and has multi-
plicative depth ∣n∣−1 if n is a power of two and ∣n∣ otherwise,
where ∣n∣ = logn is the bitlength of n:
f ∣n∣([a1, . . . , an]) = Πni=1ai
Proof: For the proof we consider two cases: n is a power
of two (i.e., n = 2l for some l), and n is not a power of two.
a) The Power of Two Case: The proof is inductive.
Assume n = 2l, we show by induction on l. The base case
trivially holds. For the inductive step, we assume the statement
holds for n = 2l and show it holds for n′ = 2l+1. By dividing
the array [a1, . . . , an′] in exactly two halves, the inductive
assumption holds for each half. Multiplying the results of both
halves concludes the proof.
b) The Other Case: The proof is constructive. Assume
n is not a power of two and let n′′ be the largest power of
two such that n′′ < n, hence ∣n′′∣ = ∣n∣. We divide [a1, . . . , an]
in two halves A1 = [a1, . . . , an′′] and A′ = [an′′+1, . . . , an].
We do this recursively for A′ and get a set of subsets
of [a1, . . . , an] which all have a power of two number of
elements. The claim then holds for each subset (from the power
of two case above) and A1 has the largest multiplicative depth
which is ∣n′′∣ − 1. By joining the result from A1 and A′, we
get the product Πni=1ai with one more multiplication resulting
in a multiplicative depth of ∣n′′∣ = ∣n∣.
Now, we know that sequentially multiplying comparison
results on the path to a leaf results in a multiplicative depth
which is linear in the depth of tree and increase the noise
explosively. Instead of doing the multiplication sequentially,
we will therefore do it in such a way as to preserve a loga-
rithmic multiplicative depth. This is described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 consists of a main function and a sub-function.
The main function EVALPATHSE collects for each leaf v
encrypted comparison results on the path from the root to v
and passes it as an array to the sub-function EVALMUL which
is a divide and conquer type. The sub-function follows the
construction described in the proof of Lemma 6.2. It divides
the array in two parts (left and right) such that the left part has
a power of two number of elements. Then it calls the recursion
on the two part and returns the product of their results.
The two functions in Algorithm 5 correctly compute the
multiplication of decision bits for each path. While highly
parallelizable, it is still not optimal, as each path is considered
individually. Since multiple paths in a binary tree share a
common prefix (from the root), one would ideally want to
handle common prefixes one time and not many times for
each leaf. This can be solved using memoization technique
which is an optimization that stores results of expensive
function calls such that they can be used latter if needed.
Unfortunately, naive memoization would require a complex
synchronization in a multi-threaded environment and linear
multiplicative depth. In the next paragraph, we propose a pre-
computation on the tree, that would allow us to have the best
of both worlds - multiplication with logarithmic depth along
the paths, while reusing the result of common prefixes, thus,
avoiding unnecessary work.
D. Improving Path Evaluation with Pre-Computation
The idea behind this optimization is to use directed acyclic
graph which we want to define first.
Definition 6.3 (DAG): A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is
a graph with directed edges in which there are no cycles. A
vertex v of a DAG is said to be reachable from another vertex
u if there exists a non-trivial path that starts at u and ends at
v. The reachability relationship is a partial order ≤ and we say
that two vertices u and v are ordered as u ≤ v if there exists
a directed path from u to v.
We require our DAGs to have a unique maximum element.
The edges in the DAG define dependency relation between
vertices.
Definition 6.4 (Dependency Graph): Let h be the function
that takes two DAGs G1,G2 and returns a new DAG G3 that
connects the maxima of G1 and G2. We define the function
g([a1, . . . , an]) that takes an array of integers and returns:● a graph with a single vertex labeled with a1 if n = 1● h(g([a1, . . . , an′]), g([an′+1, . . . , an])) if n > 1 holds,
where n′ = 2∣n∣−1 and ∣n∣ denotes the bitlength of n.
We call the DAG G generated by G = g([a1, . . . , an]) a
dependency graph. For each edge (ai, aj) in G such that
i < j, we say that aj depends on ai and denote this by
adding ai in the dependency list of aj . We require that if
L(j) = [ai1 , . . . , ai∣L(j)∣] is the dependency list of aj then it
holds i1 > i2 > . . . i∣L(j)∣.
An example of dependency graph generated by the function
g([a1, . . . , an]) is illustrated in Figure 6 for n = 4 and n = 5.
Lemma 6.5: Let [a1, . . . , an] be an array of n integers.
Then g([a1, . . . , an]) as defined above generates a DAG whose
maximum element is marked with an.
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a1 a2 a3 a4
[] [a1] [] [a3, a1]
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
[] [a1] [] [a3, a1] [a4]
Fig. 6: Dependency Graph for n = 4 and n = 5
1: for j = 1 to j = n do
2: for l = 1 to l = ∣L(j)∣ do
3: aj ← aj ⋅ ail
Algorithm 7: Multiplication using Dependency Lists
Lemma 6.6: Let [a1, . . . , an] be an array of n integers,
G = g([a1, . . . , an]) be a DAG as defined above and L(j) =[ai1 , . . . , ai∣L(j)∣] be the dependency list of aj . Then Algorithm
7 computes Πni=1ai and has a multiplicative depth of log(n).
The proofs of Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6 follow by induction
similar to Lemma 6.2. Before describing the improved path
evaluation algorithm, we first extend our Node data structure
by adding to it a new field representing a stack denoted dag,
that stores the dependency list. Moreover, we group the nodes
of the decision tree by level and use an array denoted level[],
such that level[0] stores a pointer to the root and level[i] stores
pointers to the child nodes of level[i − 1] for i ≥ 1. Now, we
are ready to describe the improved path evaluation algorithm
which consists of a pre-computation step and an online step.
The pre-computation is a one-time computation that de-
pends only on the structure of the decision tree and requires
no encryption. As described in Algorithm 8, its main function
COMPUTEDAG uses the leveled structure of the tree and the
dependency graph defined above to compute the dependency
list of each node in the tree (i.e., the DAG defined above). The
sub-function ADDEDGE is used to actually add nodes to the
dependency list of another node (i.e., by adding edges between
these nodes in the DAG).
The online step is described in Algorithm 9. It follows
the idea of Algorithm 7 by multiplying decision bit level-wise
depending on the dependency lists. The correctness follows
from Lemma 6.6.
VII. ARITHMETIC IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe PDT-INT, an instantiation of
the basic scheme that encodes the plaintexts such that the
computation is done using an arithmetic circuit. This means
that a ciphertext now encrypts an integer and that arithmetic
operations are no longer mod 2, but mod 2l for some l > 2.
A. Arithmetic Integer Comparison
We first describe our modified version of the Lin-Tzeng
comparison protocol [39]. The main idea of their construction
Input: integers up and low
Output: Computed v.dag for each v ∈ D ∪L
1: function COMPUTEDAG(up, low)
2: if up ≥ low then
3: return ▷ end the recursion
4: η ← low − up + 1
5: mid← 2∣η−1∣−1 − 1 + up ▷ ∣η∣ bitlength of η
6: for each v ∈ level[low] do
7: ADDEDGE(v, low,mid)
8: for i = mid + 1 to low − 1 do ▷ non-deepest leaves
9: for each v ∈ level[i] ∩L do
10: ADDEDGE(v, i,mid)
11: COMPUTEDAG(up,mid)
12: COMPUTEDAG(mid + 1, low)
Input: Node v, integers currLvl and destLvl
Output: Updated v.dag
1: function ADDEDGE(v, currLvl, destLvl)
2: w ← v
3: while currLvl > destLvl do
4: w ← w.parent
5: currLvl← currLvl − 1
6: v.dag.push(w) ▷ dag is a stack
Algorithm 8: Pre-computation of Multiplication DAG
Input: set of nodes stored by level in array level
Output: Updated v.cmp for each v ∈ L
1: function EVALPATHSP
2: for i = 1 to d do ▷ from top to bottom level
3: for each v ∈ level[i] do
4: while v.dag.empty() = false do ▷ dag = stack
5: w ← v.dag.pop()
6: ⟦v.cmp⟧← ⟦v.cmp⟧⊙ ⟦w.cmp⟧
Algorithm 9: Aggregate Decision Bits with precomputed DAG
is to reduce the greater-than comparison to the set intersection
problem of prefixes. Let xi and yj be inputs of client and
server, respectively, with the goal to compute [xi > yj].
a) Input Encoding: Let INT(zη⋯z1) = z be a function
that takes a bit string of length η and parses it into the η−bit
integer z = ∑ηl=1 zl ⋅ 2l−1. The 0-encoding V 0xi and 1-encoding
V 1xi of an integer input xi are the following vectors: V
0
xi =(viµ,⋯, vi1), V 1xi = (uiµ,⋯, ui1), such that ∀l ∈ {1 . . . µ}
vil = {INT(xiµxiµ−1⋯xil′1) if xil = 0
r
(0)
il if xil = 1
uil = {INT(xiµxiµ−1⋯xil) if xil = 1
r
(1)
il if xil = 0,
where l′ = l + 1, and r(0)il , r(1)il are random numbers of a fixed
bitlength ν > µ (e.g. 2µ ≤ r(0)il , r(1)il < 2µ+1) with LSB(r(0)il ) =
0 and LSB(r(1)il ) = 1 (LSB is the least significant bit). If the
INT function is used the compute the element at position l,
then we call it a proper encoded element otherwise we call
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it a random encoded element. Note that a random encoded
element r(1)il at position l in the 1-encoding of xi is chosen
such that it is guaranteed to be different to a proper or random
encoded element at position l in the 0-encoding of yj , and vice
versa. Hence, it enough if r(1)il and r(0)il are one or two bits
longer than any possible proper encoding element at position l.
Also note that the bitstring xiµxiµ−1⋯xil is interpreted by the
function INT as a bitstring zµ−l+1⋯z1 with length µ−l+1 where
z1 = xil, z2 = xi(l+1), . . . , zµ−l+1 = xiµ. If we see V 0xi , V 1yj as
sets, then xi > yj iff they have exactly one common element.
Lemma 7.1: Let xi and yj be two integers, then xi >
yj iff V = V 1xi − V 0yj has a unique position with 0.
b) The Protocol: Let ⟦V 0xi⟧ = ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧ (respec-
tively ⟦V 1xi⟧ = ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧) denote the componentwise
encryption of V 0xi (resp. V
1
xi ). The client sends ⟦V 0xi⟧, ⟦V 1xi⟧
to the server. To determine the comparison result for xi > yj ,
the server evaluates the function LINCOMPARE(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0yj⟧)
(Algorithm 10) which returns µ ciphertexts among which
exactly one encrypts zero if an only if xi > yj . For the
decision tree evaluation, the server omits the randomization
in Step 6 and the random permutation in Step 7, since this
not the final result. Moreover, the server collects the difference
ciphertexts cl in an array and uses the multiplication algorithm
with logarithmic multiplicative depth.
c) Difference to the original protocol: In contrast to the
original protocol of Lin and Tzeng [39], we note the following
differences:● Additively HE instead of multiplicative: As explained
above multiplication increases the noise exponentially
while addition increases it only linearly.● The INT function: Instead of relying on a collision-
free hash function as Lin and Tzeng [39], we use the
INT function which is simpler to implement and more
efficient as it produces smaller values.● The choice of random encoded elements r(0)il , r(1)il :
We choose the random encoded elements as explained
above and encrypt them, while the original protocol
uses ciphertexts chosen randomly in the ciphertext
space.● Encrypting the encodings on both side: In the original
protocol, the evaluator has access to yj in plaintext and
does not need to choose random encoded elements. By
encoding as explained in our modified version, we can
encrypt both encodings and delegate the evaluation to
a third party which is not allowed to have access to
the inputs in plaintext.● Aggregation: The multiplication of the ciphertexts re-
turned by Algorithm 10 returns a ciphertext encrypting
either 0 or a random number.
The modified comparison algorithm as used for PDTE is
illustrated in Algorithm 11. Note that, this can be computed
using binary gates as well, by encrypting the 0/1-encodings
binary-wise resulting in µ blocks of ciphertexts, computing
XOR-gates in parallel for each block, then computing OR-
gates in parallel for each block and finally summarizing the
results using AND-gates. The multiplicative depth will be 2µ.
1: function LINCOMPARE(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0yj⟧)
2: parse ⟦V 1xi⟧ as ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧
3: parse ⟦V 0yj⟧ as ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧
4: for l ∶= 1 to µ do
5: choose a random rl from the plaintext space
6: cl = ⟦(uil − vjl) ⋅ rl⟧
7: choose a random permutation pi
8: return pi(cµ,⋯, c1)
Algorithm 10: Modified Lin-Tzeng Comparison Protocol
B. Arithmetic PDTE Protocol
In this section, we use the modified Lin-Tzeng comparison
explained above for the decision tree evaluation. We follow
the structure of the basic protocol as describe in Protocol 4.
a) Encrypting the Atttribute Values: The protocol starts
with the client encrypting and sending its input to the server.
For each attribute value xi the client sends the encryptions⟦V 0xi⟧ = ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧ and ⟦V 1xi⟧ = ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧) of the
0-encoding V 0xi and 1-encoding V
1
xi of xi. Note that, this is
still compatible with the trusted randomizer technique, where
we will use sequences of integers instead of bit strings.
b) Evaluating Decision Nodes and Paths: Let yj be the
threshold of a decision node that compares to xi. We assume
that xi ≠ yj for all i, j. The parties can ensure this by having
the client adding a bit 0 the bit representation of each xi,
and the server adding a bit 1 to the bit representation of each
yj before encoding the values. Then from the definition of
the tree evaluation, we move to the right if [xi ≥ yj] or
the left otherwise. This is equivalent of testing [xi > yj] or[yj > xi], since we assume xi ≠ yj . Therefore, for each
decision node yj with corresponding attribute xi, the server
uses LINCOMPAREDT(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0yj⟧) to mark the edge right to
yj and LINCOMPAREDT(⟦V 1yj⟧, ⟦V 0xi⟧) to mark the edge left
to yj . As a result, one edge will be marked with a ciphertext of
0, while the other will be marked with a ciphertext of a random
plaintext. It follows that the sum of marks along each path of
the tree, will result to an encryption of 0 for the classification
path and an encryption of a random plaintext for other paths.
c) Computing the Result’s Ciphertext: To reveal the
final result to the client, we do the following. For each cipher-
text ⟦costv⟧ of Algorithm 12, the server chooses a random
number rv , computes ⟦resultv⟧ ← ⟦costv ⋅ rv + v.cLabel⟧
and sends the resulting ciphertexts to the client in a random
order. Alternatively, the server can make a trade-off between
communication and computation by using the shift operation
to pack many resultv in a single ciphertext.
d) Using Ciphertext Packing: Recall that our modified
Lin-Tzeng comparison requires only component-wise subtrac-
tion and a multiplication of all components. Therefore, the
client can pack the 0-encoding of each xi in one ciphertext
and sends ⟦viµ∣ . . . ∣vi1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧ instead of ⟦V 0xi⟧ (and similar
for the 1-encoding). Then the server does the same for each
threshold value and evaluates the decision node by computing
the differences ⟦dij⟧ ← ⟦uiµ − vjµ∣ . . . ∣ui1 − vj1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧ with
one homomorphic subtraction. To multiply the µ relevant
components in ⟦dij⟧, we use ∣µ∣ (bitlength of µ) left shifts and
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1: function LINCOMPAREDT(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0yj⟧)
2: parse ⟦V 1xi⟧ as ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧
3: parse ⟦V 0yj⟧ as ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧
4: let arr be an empty array of size µ
5: for l ∶= 1 to µ do
6: arr[l]← ⟦uil − vjl⟧
7: return EVALMUL(1, µ, arr)
Algorithm 11: Modified Lin-Tzeng Protocol for PDTE
1: ⟦root.cmp⟧← ⟦0⟧
2: for each v ∈ D do
3: ⟦v.right.cmp⟧← LINCOMPARE(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0yj⟧)
4: ⟦v.left.cmp⟧← LINCOMPARE(⟦V 1yj⟧, ⟦V 0xi⟧)
5: for each v ∈ L do
6: let Pv be the array of nodes on the path (root→ v)
7: ⟦costv⟧← ⟦0⟧
8: for each u ∈ Pv do
9: ⟦costv⟧← ⟦costv⟧⊕ ⟦u.cmp⟧
Algorithm 12: Arithmetic PDTE Algorithm
∣µ∣ multiplications to shift Πµl=1(uil − vjl) to the first slot. The
path evaluation and the computation of the result’s ciphertext
remain as explained above. We also note that the packing
of attribute values and the packing of threshold values work
similar to the binary implementation of Section VI.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss some implementation details and
evaluate our schemes.
A. Implementation Details
We implemented our algorithms using HElib [33] and
TFHE [18], [19]. HElib is a C++ library that implements
FHE. The current version includes an implementation of the
leveled FHE BGV scheme [8]. HElib also includes various
optimizations that make FHE runs faster, including the Smart-
Vercauteren ciphertext packing (SVCP) techniques [47].
TFHE is a C/C++ library that implements FHE proposed
by Chillotti et al. [15], [16]. It allows to evaluate any boolean
circuit on encrypted data. The current version implements
a very fast gate-by-gate bootstrapping, i.e., bootstrapping is
performed after each gate evaluation. Future versions will
include leveled FHE and ciphertext packing as described by
Chillotti et al. [17]. Dai and Sunar [22], [23] propose an
implementation of TFHE on CUDA-enabled GPUs that is 26
times faster.
We evaluated our implementation on an AWS instance
with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8124M CPU @ 3.00GHz
running Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS. The Instance has 36 CPUs,
144 GB Memory and 8 GB SSD. As the bottleneck of our
scheme is the overhead of the homomorphic computation, we
focus on the computation done by the server. We start by
generating appropriate encryption parameters and evaluating
the performance of basic operations.
Name L N λ Slots sk pk Ctxt
(bits) (MB) (MB) (MB)
HElibsmall 200 13981 151 600 52.2 51.6 1.7
HElibmed 300 18631 153 720 135.4 134.1 3.7
HElibbig 500 32109 132 1800 370.1 367.1 8.8
HElibint 450 24793 138.161 6198 370.1 367.1 8.8
TFHE128 ∞ 1024 128 1 82.1 82.1 0.002
TABLE IV: Key Generation’s Parameters and Results
HElib Enc Single Enc Vector Dec Single Dec Vector
Context (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
HElibsmall 59.21 59.41 26.08 26.38
HElibmed 124.39 124.93 54.31 54.92
HElibbig 283.49 284.31 127.11 128.32
HElibint 323.41 488.77 88.63 93.50
TFHE128 0.04842 n/a 0.00129 n/a
TABLE V: Encryption/Decryption Runtime
B. Basic Operations
Recall that our plaintext space is usually a ring
Zq[X]/(XN + 1) and that the encryption scheme might be
a leveled FHE with parameter L. For HElib, the parameters
N and L determines how to generate encryption keys for a se-
curity level λ which is at least 128 in all our experiments. Table
IV summarizes the parameters we used for key generation and
the resulting sizes for encryption keys and ciphertexts. We will
refer to it as homomorphic context or just context. For HElib,
one needs to choose L large enough than the depth of the cir-
cuit to be evaluated and then computes an appropriate value for
N that ensures a security level at least 128. We experimented
with tree different contexts (HElibsmall,HElibmed,HElibbig) for
the binary representation used in PDT-BIN and the context
HElibint for the integer representation used in PDT-INT. For
TFHE, the default value of N is 1024 and the security level can
be chosen up to 128 while L is infinite because of the gate-by-
gate bootstrapping. We used the context TFHE128 to evaluate
PDT-BIN with TFHE. Table V reports the average runtime for
encryption and decryption over 100 runs. The columns “Enc
Vector” and “Dec Vector” stand for encryption and decryption
using SIMD encoding and decoding, which is not supported
by TFHE yet.
C. Homomorphic Operations in HElib
The opposite to the notion of ciphertext noise is the
notion of ciphertext capacity or just capacity which is also
determined by L and estimates the capacity of a ciphertext to
be used in homomorphic operations. In Figure 13 and 14, we
reported the remaining capacity of a ciphertext after a number
of consecutive additions or multiplications starting from the
values of L in Table IV. They show that the capacity is reduced
only slightly after addition, but explosively after multiplication.
Note that the encryption operation already has an impact on L.
Figure 15 shows that doing the multiplication with logarithmic
depth (Lemma 6.2) reduced the capacity sublinearly instead
of linearly as in Figure 14. The sublinear complexity is also
illustrated in Figure 16 for the comparison circuit which also
has a logarithmic multiplicative depth [12]–[14]. Figure 17
illustrates runtimes (best and average) for addition and multi-
plication in HElib over 100 runs showing that homomorphic
addition is really fast compare to multiplication. We report
the runtime for the comparison circuit in Figure 18 comparing
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runtime for HElib and TFHE. While both are linear in the
bitlength, the runtime for HElib increases very quickly.
D. Performance of PDT-BIN
In this section, we report on our experiment with PDT-BIN
on complete trees. Recall that for FHE supporting SIMD, we
can use attribute values packing that allows to evaluate many
attribute vectors together. We, therefore, focus on attribute
packing to show the advantage of SIMD. Figure 19 illustrates
the amortized runtime of PDT-BIN with HElib. That is, the
time of one PDTE evaluation divided by the number of slots
provided by the used homomorphic context. As one can expect,
the runtime clearly depends on the bitlength of the attribute
values and the depth of the tree. The results show a clear
advantage of HElib when classifying large data sets. For paths
aggregation, we proposed EVALPATHSE (Algorithm 5) and
EVALPATHSP (Algorithm 9). Figure 20 illustrates PDT-BIN
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runtime using these algorithms in a multi-threaded environ-
ment and shows a clear advantage of EVALPATHSP which will
be used in the remaining experiments with PDT-BIN. Figure
21 illustrates the runtime of PDT-BIN with HElibmed showing
that the computation cost is dominated by the computation
of decision bits which involves homomorphic evaluation of
comparison circuits. In Figure 22, we report the evaluation of
PDT-BIN using TFHE, which shows a clear advantage compare
to HElib. For the same experiment with 72 threads, TFHE
evaluates a complete tree of depth 10 and 64-bit input in less
than 80 seconds, while HElib takes about 400 seconds for 16-
bit input. Recall that, a CUDA implementation [22], [23] of
TFHE can further improve the time of PDT-BIN using TFHE.
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Heart-disease Housing Spambase Artificial
(HDI) (HOU) (SPA) (ART)
n 13 13 57 16
d 3 13 17 10
m 5 92 58 500
TABLE VI: Real Datasets and Model Parameters
PDT-BIN PDT-BIN PDT-INT [41] [48]
(TFHE) (HElib) (HElib) (HElib) (mcl)
λ 128 150 135 128 128
µ 16 16 16 12 64
#thd 16 16 16 16 -
one am. one am. one one one
HDI 0.94 0.05 40.61 0.0073 45.59 0.59 0.25
HOU 6.30 0.35 252.38 0.90 428.23 10.27 1.98
SPA 3.66 0.24 174.46 0.72 339.60 6.88 1.80
ART 22.39 1.81 1303.55 0.75 2207.13 56.37 10.42
TABLE VII: Runtime (in seconds) of PDTE on Real Datasets:
λ is the security level. µ is the input bit length. #thd is the number of threads. mcl[42]
is a pairing-based cryptography library. Column “one” reports the time for one protocol
run while “am.” reports the amortized time (e.g., the time for one run divided by s).
E. Performance of our Schemes on Real Datasets
We also performed experiments on real datasets from
the UCI repository [51]. We performed experiments for both
PDT-BIN and PDT-INT for the datasets illustrated in Table VII
(parameters n, d,m are defined in Table I). For PDT-BIN, we
reported the costs for HElib (single and amortized) and the
costs for TFHE. Since TFHE evaluates only boolean circuits,
we only have implementation and evaluation of PDT-INT with
HElib. We also illustrate in Table VII the costs of two best
previous works that rely only on homomorphic encryption,
whereby the figures are taken from the respective papers [41],
[48]. For one protocol run, PDT-BIN with TFHE is much
more faster than PDT-BIN with HElib which is also faster than
PDT-INT with HElib. However, because of the large number of
slots, the amortized cost of PDT-BIN with HElib is better. For
16-bit inputs, our amortized time with HElib and our time with
TFHE outperform XCMP [41] which used 12-bit inputs. For
the same input bitlength, XCMP is still much more better than
our one run using HElib, since the multiplicative depth is just
3. However, our schemes still have a better communication
and PDT-BIN has no leakage. While the scheme of Tai et
al. [48] in the semi-honest model has a better time for 64-
bit inputs than our schemes for 16-bit inputs, it requires a
fast network communication and at least double cost in the
malicious model. The efficiency of Tai et al. is in part due to
their ECC implementation of the lifted ElGamal [27], which
allows a fast runtime and smaller ciphertexts, but is not secure
against a quantum attacker, unlike lattice-based FHE as used
in our schemes.
IX. CONCLUSION
While almost all existing PDTE protocols require many
interaction between the client and the server, we designed
and implemented novel client-server protocols that delegate
the complete evaluation to the server while preserving privacy
and keeping the overhead low. Our solutions rely on SHE/FHE
and evaluate the tree on ciphertexts encrypted under the
client’s public key. Since current SHE/FHE schemes have
high overhead, we combine efficient data representations with
different algorithmic optimizations to keep the computational
overhead and the communication cost low.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Proof of Lemma 7.1
Proof: If V = V 1xi−V 0yj has a unique 0 at a position l, (1 ≤
l ≤ µ) then uil and vil have bit representation zµ−l+1⋯z1,
where for each h,µ − l + 1 ≥ h ≥ 2, zh = xig = xjg with
g = l + h − 1, and z1 = xil = 1 and xjl = 0. It follows that
xi > yj .
If xi > yj then there exists a position l such that for each
h,µ ≥ h ≥ l + 1, xih = xjh and xil = 1 and xjl = 0. This
implies uil = vil.
For h,µ ≥ h ≥ l + 1, either uih bit string is a prefix of xi
while vjh is random, or uih is random while vjh bit string is a
prefix of yj . From the choice of r
(0)
ih , r
(1)
ih , we have uih ≠ vih.
For h, l − 1 ≥ h ≥ 1 there are three cases: uih and vih (as
bit string) are both prefixes of xi and yj , only one of them
is prefix, both are random. For the first case the difference of
the bits at position l and for the other cases the choice of r(0)ih
imply that uih ≠ vih.
B. correctness
The correctness for the basic scheme follows directly
from Lemma 5.3. For the binary implementation, we proved
with Lemmas 6.2, 6.5, 6.6 that aggregating the paths using
Algorithms 5 and 9 is correct. For the integer implementation,
Lemma 7.1 ensures the correctness of the comparison. The
classification path is marked with 0 on all edges while the
other paths are marked with at least one random number. As a
result, summing up the marks along the paths returns 0 for the
classification path and a random number for all other paths.
C. security
It is straightforward to see that our protocols are secure.
There is no interaction with the client during the computation
and a semi-honest server sees only IND-CPA ciphertexts. A
semi-honest client only learns the encryption of the result (and
additional encryptions of random elements for PDT-INT). A
malicious server can only return a false classification result.
This is inherent to private function evaluation where the func-
tion (the decision tree in our case) is an input to the computa-
tion. A malicious client can send a too “noisy” ciphertext, such
that after the computation at the server a correct decryption
is not possible, leaking some information. This attack works
only with level FHE and is easy to deal with, namely the
computation of a ciphertext capacity is a public function which
the server can use to check the ciphertexts before starting the
computation. Therefore, we state the following:
Theorem A.1: Our protocols correctly and securely imple-
ment the PDTE functionality FPDTE.
As PDT-BIN returns the bit representation of the resulted
classification label whose bitlength is public (i.e., the set of
possible classification labels is known to the client), there is
no leakage beyond the final output. PDT-INT returns as many
ciphertexts as there are leaves and, therefore, leaks the number
of decision nodes.
APPENDIX B
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
We now analyse the complexity of our scheme, distinguish-
ing between the binary and the integer implementations. In the
following, we assume that the decision tree is a complete tree
with depth d.
A. Complexity of the Binary Implementation
The SHE comparison circuit has multiplicative depth ∣µ −
1∣ + 1 and requires O(µ ⋅ ∣µ∣) multiplications [12]–[14]. That
is, the evaluation of all decision nodes requires O(2dµ ⋅ ∣µ∣)
multiplications. The path evaluation has a multiplicative depth
of ∣d−1∣ and requires for all 2d paths O(d2d) multiplications.
The evaluation of the leaves has a multiplicative depth of 1 and
requires in total 2d multiplications. The total multiplicative
depth for PDT-BIN is, therefore, ∣µ − 1∣ + ∣d − 1∣ + 2 ≈∣µ∣ + ∣d∣ + 2 while the total number of multiplications isO(2dµ ⋅ ∣µ∣ + d2d + 2d) ≈ O(d2d).
For the label packing, the bit representation of each clas-
sification label is packed in one ciphertext. This hold for the
final result as well. As a result, if the tree is complete and
all classification labels are distinct, then the server sends ⌈d
s
⌉
ciphertext(s) to client. In practice, however, ⌈d
s
⌉ = 1 holds as
d is smaller that the number s of slots.
For threshold packing, the decision bit at node v will be
encrypted as ⟦bv ∣0∣...∣0⟧. Then if we encrypt the classification
label ci = ci∣k∣...ci1 as ⟦ci∣k∣∣0∣...∣0⟧, ..., ⟦ci1∣0∣...∣0⟧, the final
result cl will be encrypted similarly such that with extra shifts,
we can build the ciphertext ⟦cl∣k∣∣...∣cl1∣0∣...∣0⟧. As a result, the
server sends only 1 ciphertext back to the client.
For other cases (e.g., attribute packing, or no packing at
all as in the current implementation of TFHE), the bits of a
classification label are encrypted separately which holds for
the final result as well. As a result the server sends back d
ciphertexts to the client.
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Gate Name Gate Functionality Run-time (ms)
128-bit security
CONSTANT result = encode(int) 0.00052
NOT result = ¬a 0.00051
COPY result = a 0.00035
NAND result = ¬(a ∧ b) 11.32751
OR result = a ∨ b 11.40669
AND result = a ∧ b 11.38739
XOR result = a + b mod 2 11.39326
XNOR result = (a = b) 11.39418
NOR result = ¬(a ∨ b) 11.39813
ANDNY result = ¬a ∧ b 11.39255
ANDYN result = a ∧ ¬b 11.39737
ORNY result = ¬a ∨ b 11.40777
ORYN result = a ∨ ¬b 11.39940
MUX result = a?b ∶ c 21.29517
TABLE VIII: TFHE Binary Bootstrapping Gates
B. Complexity of the Integer Implementation
The modified LinTzeng comparison circuit has multiplica-
tive ∣µ−1∣ and requires O(µ − 1) multiplications. As a result,
the evaluation of all decision node requires O((µ − 1)2d)
multiplications. In PDT-INT, the path evaluation does not
requires any multiplication. However, the leave evaluation has
a multiplicative depth of 1 and requires in total 2d multiplica-
tions. The total multiplicative depth for PDT-INT is therefore∣µ − 1∣ + 1 ≈ ∣µ∣ + 1 while the total number of multiplications
is O((µ − 1)2d + 2d) ≈ O(2d).
For PDT-INT, it is not possible to aggregate the leaves as
in PDT-BIN. If the client is classifying many inputs, the server
must send 2d ciphertexts back. If the client is classifying only
one input, then the server can use shifts to pack the result in⌈ 2d
s
⌉ ciphertext(s).
APPENDIX C
HOMOMORPHIC OPERATIONS IN TFHE
As already mentioned earlier, the current version of TFHE
only supports binary gates. According to Chillotti et al. [16],
[18], gate bootstrapping and gate evaluation cost about 13 ms
for all binary gates except for the MUX gate, which costs 26
ms on a modern processor. For a full list of available gates,
we refer to Chillotti et al. [19]. In Table VIII, we illustrate
the runtime of TFHE’s gate evaluation with our testbed. The
figures are given as average over 1000 runs.
APPENDIX D
EXTENSION TO RANDOM FOREST
In this section, we briefly describe how the binary imple-
mentation PDT-BIN can be extended to evaluate a random
forest non-interactively. A random forest is a generalization
of decision tree which consists of many trees. A classification
with a random forest then evaluates each tree in the forest
and outputs the classification label which occurs most often.
Hence, the classification labels are ranked by their number of
occurrences and the final result is the best ranked one.
Let the random forest consists of trees T1, . . . ,TN and
let PDT-BINS(Tj , x) denote the evaluation of the decision
tree Tj on input vector x resulting in Tj(x) = Rj , which
is encrypted as ⟦Rbj⟧ = (⟦Rj∣k∣⟧, . . . , ⟦Rj1⟧), where Rbj =
Rj∣k∣ . . .Rj1. Let’s assume, there are k classification labels
c1, . . . , ck with cbi = ci∣k∣ . . . ci1 and each ci has encryptions
1: for j = 1 to N do
2: ⟦Rbj⟧← PDT-BINS(Tj , x)
3: for i = 1 to k do
4: ⟦bij⟧← SHEEQUAL(⟦Rbj⟧, ⟦cbi ⟧)
5: ⟦result⟧← ⟦0⟧
6: for i = 1 to k do
7: ⟦fbi ⟧← SHEFADDER(⟦bi1⟧, . . . , ⟦biN⟧)
8: ⟦ei⟧← SHECMP(⟦fbi ⟧, ⟦tb⟧)
9: ⟦result⟧← ⟦result⟧⊕ (⟦ei⟧⊙ ⟦c⃗i⟧)
10: return ⟦result⟧
Algorithm 23: Private Random Forest With Majority Voting
1: Compute ⟦fbi ⟧ as in Algorithm 23 Lines 1 to 7
2: for i ∶= 1 to k do
3: ⟦βii⟧← ⟦1⟧
4: for j ∶= i + 1 to k do
5: (⟦βij⟧, ⟦βji⟧)← SHECMP(⟦fbi ⟧, ⟦fbj ⟧)
6: for i ∶= 1 to k do
7: ⟦rbi ⟧← SHEFADDER(⟦βi1⟧, . . . , ⟦βik⟧)
8: for i ∶= 1 to k do
9: ⟦ei⟧← SHEEQUAL(⟦rbi ⟧, ⟦kb⟧)
10: for i ∶= 1 to k do
11: ⟦result⟧← ⟦result⟧⊕ (⟦ei⟧⊙ ⟦c⃗i⟧)
12: return ⟦result⟧
Algorithm 24: Private Random Forest with Maximum Voting
⟦cbi ⟧ = (⟦ci∣k∣⟧, . . . , ⟦ci1⟧) and ⟦c⃗i⟧ = ⟦ci∣k∣∣ . . . ∣ci1⟧. Let fi
denote the number of occurrences of ci after evaluating the
N trees, with encryption ⟦fbi ⟧ = (⟦fi∣N ∣⟧, . . . , ⟦fi1⟧), where
fbi = fi∣N ∣ . . . fi1.
The computation requires the routine SHECMP and two
new ones: SHEFADDER and SHEEQUAL.
Full adder: Let bi1, . . . , bin be n bits such that ri = ∑nj=1 bij
and let rbi = ri logn, . . . , ri1 be the bit representation of
ri. The routine SHEFADDER implements a full adder on⟦bi1⟧, . . . , ⟦bin⟧ and returns ⟦rbi ⟧ = (⟦ri logn⟧, . . . , ⟦ri1⟧).
Equality testing: There is no built-in routine for equal-
ity check in HElib. We implemented it using SHECMP and
SHEADD. Let xi and xj be two ∣k∣-bit integers. We use SHEE-
QUAL to denote the equality check routine and implement
SHEEQUAL(⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧) by computing:● (⟦b′i⟧, ⟦b′′i ⟧) = SHECMP(⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧) and● ⟦βi⟧ = (⟦b′i⟧ ⊕ ⟦b′′i ⟧ ⊕ ⟦1⟧), which results in βi = 1 if
xi = xj and βi = 0 otherwise.
To select the best label, the random forest algorithm either
uses majority voting or argmax. For majority voting, ci is the
final result if an only if fi ≥ t, where t = ⌈N2 ⌉ with bit represen-
tation tb = t∣N ∣ . . . t1 and encryption ⟦tb⟧ = (⟦t∣N ∣⟧, . . . , ⟦t1⟧).
The computation is described in Algorithm 23. For argmax,
ci is the final result if an only if fi is larger than all other
fj , j ≠ i. The computation is described in Algorithm 24.
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